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ABSTRACT
Policymakers often use tax incentives to encourage desirable taxpayer behavior, and
researchers from multiple disciplines provide evidence that these incentives lead to behavioral
change. A new stream of literature focuses on the factors that affect the extent to which tax
incentives achieve this goal, with specific emphasis on the factor of complexity. This study
expands this literature by investigating the effect of eligibility determination complexity and tax
incentive structure on the relationship between incentives and taxpayer behavior. Based on the
findings from research on the take-up of social benefits, I predict and find some evidence that
taxpayers are more likely to respond to a tax incentive when determining eligibility for the
incentive is less complex. In response to preferences for the credit structure in legal and
economics literature and a similar preference in the business press, I predict, but do not find, that
taxpayers are more likely to respond to a tax incentive structured as a credit versus an
economically equivalent deduction. However, I do find evidence to suggest that structure is
important when eligibility determination complexity is high – taxpayers seem to be less likely to
behave as incentivized given an increase in eligibility determination complexity in a credit
structure. This finding of a significant interaction between a form of complexity and incentive
structure should motivate researchers to include a manipulation of incentive structure in future
complexity studies. Results of my study should also be of interest to tax policymakers at various
levels of government as I find evidence suggesting a wholesale switch in tax incentives to the
credit structure (a change advocated by many legal and economics researchers) could weaken
taxpayer response when the credit features high eligibility determination complexity.
ii
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I. INTRODUCTION
While the primary goal of the United States (US) tax system is the generation of revenue
to fund the activities of government, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is frequently used to
encourage (discourage) behavior deemed desirable (undesirable) by Congress. These behavioral
changes are incentivized through preferential tax rates, income exclusions, deductions, and/or
credits. Because the goal of these tax incentives is to change taxpayer behavior, it is important to
gain a greater understanding of factors that impact the extent to which these incentives are
effective in changing taxpayer behavior. Researchers have recently focused their attention on
one such factor – complexity (Morrow and Rupert 2015, Bobek, Chen, Hageman, and Tian 2016,
Morrow, Stinson, and Doxey 2018). The primary goal of this study is to extend this research by
further investigating the role of complexity in the relationship between tax incentives and
taxpayer behavior. Specifically, I aim to determine whether differences in the difficulty of
determining eligibility for a tax incentive and differences in tax incentive structure affect the
extent to which a tax incentive changes taxpayer behavior. Per Slemrod (2005), “there is no
consensus regarding what constitutes complexity” (281). For the purpose of this paper,
complexity refers to the difficulty a taxpayer faces when interacting with tax laws that establish
tax incentives. This includes, for example, difficulty encountered in determining eligibility for a
tax incentive, in determining the timing of the tax incentive, and in determining the actual tax
effect of the tax incentive through tax calculations.
The idea that complexity can affect the extent to which taxpayers change their behavior
in response to tax incentives is logical and intuitive. In fact, studies cited above provide some
1

evidence that complexity affects taxpayer behavior when a certain behavior is incentivized.
However, complexity in the tax environment is multi-faceted and can be operationalized in a
study in various ways. To better understand how complexity moderates the relationship between
tax incentives and taxpayer behavior, more research is required. My study answers the call of
Bobek et al. (2016) for additional research to determine the effects of different forms of
complexity.
In this study I predict that taxpayers will be more likely to respond to tax incentives when
determining eligibility for the incentive is less complex. I refer to this continuum of complexity
going forward as “eligibility determination complexity.” Researchers in other (non-accounting)
disciplines have studied a similar variable under a different name – “hassle” costs – and have
found evidence to suggest it significantly (negatively) affects the take-up1 of social benefits
programs like the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), and Medicaid (Currie 2006, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2006, Bhargava and
Manoli 2015). The stakes are often quite high for the individuals eligible to participate in these
means-tested programs – a choice not to participate will almost certainly have a negative impact
on the well-being of families involved. Taxpayers responding to tax incentives that generally
encourage the spending of discretionary income will likely have significantly less to lose when
choosing not to behave as incentivized, so I expect these taxpayers will also be affected by
eligibility determination complexity.
I also predict that taxpayers will be more responsive to tax incentives structured as tax
credits (as compared to tax deductions). A strong preference exists for the credit structure on the
grounds of equity and efficiency in economics and legal literature (Batchelder, Goldberg Jr., and

“Take-up” refers to the rate at which individuals eligible to receive benefits through a given program actually
pursue and apply for those benefits.
1
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Orszag 2006, Batchelder 2017, Stegmaier 2008, Furman 2008, Fischer and Huang 2013), with
frequent calls for all tax incentives to be structured as (refundable) credits. Similarly, writers in
business press (Steber 2016, Lankford 2007) tend to favor the credit structure, often advising
readers to focus their attention and effort on credits instead of deductions.
Finally, I explore as a research question whether changes in eligibility determination
complexity differentially affect incentives structured as credits versus deductions. Research on
the effect of incentive structure on taxpayer behavior is quite limited, so it is difficult to predict
the existence and nature of an interaction between forms of complexity and incentive structure.
The studies addressing complexity have generally held constant the tax incentive structure, so
finding evidence of this interaction could extend our understanding of the effect of complexity
on taxpayer response to tax incentives.
I address my research questions and test my hypotheses by conducting an experiment.
My experimental setting is adapted from Morrow and Rupert (2015), which uses a hypothetical
purchase decision setting to investigate the effect of complexity (specifically, complexity in the
form of conformity between federal and state tax laws and complexity in the form of incentive
tax effect calculation complexity) on taxpayer purchasing decisions. Participants are asked to
assist a friend who is finalizing a vehicle purchase decision, which has been narrowed to two
similar and equally-acceptable alternatives – a traditional (gas) vehicle and a hybrid vehicle.
Participants make their recommendations (the operationalized dependent variable of interest)
after considering the cost and features of each vehicle and the economic value of a tax incentive.
The incentive is manipulated in eligibility determination complexity (low complexity vs. high
complexity) and in incentive structure (credit vs. deduction), resulting in a 2×2 betweenparticipants experimental design.

3

Addressing these research questions using an experimental methodology is appropriate
for two important reasons. The experimental methodology allows me to analyze the effects of
the variables of interest while holding constant the content (i.e., purpose, goals) and the
economic effect of the tax incentive. To capture the effect of eligibility determination
complexity and/or incentive structure using existing data (i.e., publicly-available IRS data), the
same tax incentive would need to be offered simultaneously to taxpayers in multiple structures
and varying levels of eligibility determination complexity. But, taxpayers respond to tax
incentives structured as credits or deductions – they are not allowed to choose their preferred
structure. Further, some incentives set forth by the IRC are relatively similar in purpose, but
have significantly different rules, limits, and exceptions, which lead to different economic
outcomes across incentives.
I find that eligibility determination complexity does significantly affect taxpayer response
to tax incentives under some modeling conditions. Participants in multiple subsamples
responding to an incentive featuring low eligibility determination complexity provided
recommendations significantly more in favor of the tax-incentivized hybrid model than those
responding to an incentive featuring high complexity. However, I do not find evidence to
support my prediction that taxpayers will be more likely to respond to tax incentives structured
as tax credits versus tax deductions. I find some evidence of differences in taxpayer feelings
toward the two structures as participants assigned to groups featuring a credit structure indicate a
significantly greater level of certainty regarding the actual tax effect of the tax incentive
encountered in the task than those in groups featuring a deduction structure. Lastly, although I
do not find evidence to suggest that participants were influenced by incentive structure alone, I
find some evidence in various subsamples of interest of an interaction of these two variables –

4

the effect of eligibility determination complexity on the dependent variable appears, in some
cases, to depend on the tax incentive structure.
Understanding the extent to which eligibility determination complexity affects the
relationship between tax incentives and taxpayer behavior is important for multiple reasons.
First, a taxpayer facing a behavioral decision involving a tax incentive can often consider
eligibility for a given tax incentive without consideration of detailed tax calculations and
estimations. Considering eligibility, therefore, is likely easier for a taxpayer to consider before
making the decision than many other factors in the tax incentive decision context.
Understanding the effect of eligibility determination complexity on taxpayer behavior is also
important to policymakers. If a tax incentive is created with the intent of changing taxpayer
behavior, policymakers should be concerned about the possibility that some taxpayers will
underreact to the incentive because of the complexity they encounter in determining their
eligibility. Legitimate reasons certainly exist to justify some level of complexity in the eligibility
requirements associated with a tax incentive – avoiding abuse, targeting subsets of the taxpaying
population, etc. However, my study provides some evidence that even modest increases in
eligibility determination complexity could be detrimental to the effectiveness of a tax incentive.
Policymakers should also be concerned about how tax incentive structure affects taxpayer
response to a given tax incentive. Consideration of the structure of current and past tax
incentives leaves open questions regarding policymaker decisions about these structures. As
mentioned above, I find some evidence to suggest that complexity (eligibility determination
complexity in my study) may affect tax incentives structured as credits, but not deductions. This,
combined with the finding of a significant difference in certainty mentioned above, reveals that
taxpayers respond differently to different tax incentive structures, which should inform the

5

legislative process for new tax incentives and re-designs of existing incentives. Policymakers, it
seems, should consider an approach that favors the tax credit structure when policy goals can be
achieved with low eligibility determination complexity, but favors the tax deduction structure
when higher levels of eligibility determination complexity are required.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter II provides background
information, a review of applicable literature, and develops hypotheses; Chapter III details the
research methodology and design; Chapter IV details the analysis of results; and Chapter V
provides a conclusion.

6

II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Background
Policymakers generally choose from two available methods for encouraging desirable
taxpayer behavior - direct government subsidies and incentives delivered through the Internal
Revenue Code (commonly referred to as “tax expenditures”). While the direct government
subsidy approach entails sending cash payments directly to taxpayers, the tax expenditure
approach is different. Instead of encouraging citizens with an incentive in the form of cash, this
approach offers an incentive in the form of a reduced tax bill.2 In their book, Taxes in America:
What Everyone Needs to Know, Leonard Burman and Joel Slemrod present an argument for why
politicians prefer to run programs through the IRC. Tax expenditures, they explain, are not
considered spending for budget purposes, and this lower level of public scrutiny makes them a
much more politically attractive tool to encourage desirable taxpayer behavior (Burman and
Slemrod 2013, 150-151).
Examples of behavior deemed desirable and incentivized by policymakers abound in the
IRC. Home ownership is considered to be desirable – that is, our society benefits from increased
home ownership. So, taxpayers were once allowed to reduce their tax bills through a tax
incentive that encouraged home purchases by first-time homebuyers. Charitable giving provides
funding to charitable organizations providing goods and services that would otherwise require

2

An example of the government incentivizing desirable behavior directly is subsidy payments made to farmers to
encourage the planting of certain crops or to encourage no planting to allow fields to “rest.” Examples of “tax
expenditures” include tax incentives such as income exclusions for health insurance premium payments and tax
credits related to the pursuit of higher education.
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direct government spending through government programs. This substitution has been deemed
desirable, so taxpayers see their taxes reduced by amounts donated to qualifying charitable
organizations. Entrepreneurship and risk-taking has been deemed desirable and is encouraged
through opportunities to reduce taxes via relaxed limitations on losses incurred on small business
stock.
Researchers have devoted significant attention to determining the extent to which the
incentives delivered through the nation’s tax system actually affect taxpayer behavior. Two such
incentives – an incentive to encourage charitable giving (Peloza and Steel 2005, Duquette 2016)
and an incentive to encourage investment in research and development (Bloom, Griffith, and
Van Reenen 2002, Wilson 2009) - have garnered a great deal of attention from researchers in
various disciplines. This research leads to significant evidence supporting the effectiveness of
tax incentives in changing taxpayer behavior.
Factors Affecting Taxpayer Reaction to Tax Incentives
Researchers in a recently-developing stream in the accounting literature, it seems, rely on
the results of the studies above and begin with the baseline assumption that tax incentives do
indeed influence taxpayer behavior. Their focus shifts from whether tax incentives influence
behavior to uncovering factors that affect the extent to which these incentives can change
taxpayer behavior. Morrow et al. (2018), for instance, examine (among other things) the effect
of various demographic factors (age and experience with filing tax returns) on the effectiveness
of a tax incentive aimed at encouraging participation in the health insurance exchanges that
resulted from the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
My study answers a call for additional research by Bobek et al. (2016) to better
understand the effect of another factor affecting the relationship between tax incentives and
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taxpayer behavior - complexity. Morrow and Rupert (2015) initiated this stream of literature
with a study that investigates the effect of a type of tax incentive complexity – federal / state tax
law conformity – on taxpayer reaction to incentives aimed at encouraging the purchase of a
certain type of vehicle. Results of the study indicate that participants are more likely to consider
purchasing a hybrid vehicle (instead of a nearly-identical traditional gas-burning vehicle) when
federal and state tax incentives that encourage such behavior are similar (conforming) instead of
dissimilar (non-conforming). The study by Bobek, et al. (2016) followed and investigates the
effect of complexity on taxpayer reaction to tax incentives using a different variation of
complexity – choice complexity. Participants were encouraged to participate in a training
program that could lead to higher earnings with incentives that reduced the cost of the program,
either choosing from a few incentive options or many. Results suggest that the number of
choices available for the same incentivized behavior (choice complexity) does not affect the
likelihood of an individual choosing the incentivized behavior, but that more choice complexity
does lead to errors in an individual’s ability to determine optimal choices.
These two studies that addressed the effect of complexity on taxpayer response to tax
incentives operationalized complexity in very different manners. These differences in approach
illuminate the fact that complexity is multi-faceted. In their call for further research, Bobek et al.
(2016) offer several suggestions as additional facets of complexity possibly worth exploration.
My study investigates one such suggestion – complexity related to an individual determining
eligibility to take advantage of a tax incentive, hereafter referred to as eligibility determination
complexity.

9

Eligibility Determination Complexity
Eligibility determination complexity varies widely among tax incentives – one can easily
determine eligibility to take advantage of the deduction for educator expenses. However,
determining eligibility to take advantage of the EITC can be a daunting task.3 Researchers in
various disciplines have addressed the idea of eligibility determination complexity (sometimes
referred to as “hassle”) indirectly in the context of the take-up of social benefits. The fact that
many social programs (Medicaid programs, welfare-type programs, etc.) have low levels of takeup is somewhat surprising as most of the media attention on these programs seems to be reserved
for abuse in the form of individuals improperly receiving benefits. Researchers with economics,
public policy, and various other backgrounds have studied this take-up phenomenon extensively.
Per Currie (2006), the literature seems to agree that individuals that are eligible but choose not to
receive social program benefits make that choice for one or more of three reasons – “stigma,
transactions costs, and lack of information.” The costs associated with enrolling in various
social programs is of particular interest in this study and is worth additional consideration.4
To introduce and motivate her literature review, Currie (2006) points to Moffitt’s (1983)
traditional economic model, which incorporates stigma as a cost that impacts an eligible
individual’s utility maximization when deciding whether to enroll in welfare. Currie (2006),
however, states that more recent literature “suggests that other costs associated with the takeup

3

A comparison of relevant IRS Publications for the 2018 tax year reveals that taxpayers eligible for the deduction
for educator expenses are described using one sentence (see IRS Publication 529 at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p529.pdf) while taxpayers eligible for the EITC are described through an “EIC Eligibility Checklist” that
includes twelve steps and references to fifteen rules (see IRS Publication 596 at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p596.pdf).
4
While stigma is certainly a factor deserving attention in the arena of public insurance and welfare programs, it
almost certainly would not be an important factor when considering most of the behaviors incentivized through the
IRC. Lack of information about tax incentives could play a more important role in the relationship between a tax
incentive and a taxpayer’s behavioral decision, but the amount of information presented in this study will be held
constant (see below in the Methodology and Design chapter).
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of social programs are more important than stigma,” such as “costs of learning about, and
applying for the programs” (Currie 2006, 6). Similarly, Bertrand et al. (2006) points to three
factors that can affect take-up in addition to stigma – knowledge/understanding of the program
by targeted recipients, “hassle factors” that serve as demotivation, and procrastination.
Some of the work by researchers in other (non-accounting) disciplines has actually
addressed the take-up of a social benefit that is delivered through the IRC and functions much
like the tax incentives considered in this study.5 The EITC is, per the IRS (2019a), a “benefit for
working people who have low to moderate income.” More specifically, Burman and Slemrod
(2013), refer to the EITC as “one of the largest antipoverty programs in the United States” (8).
The EITC suffers, like many other social programs, from lower-than-expected take-up. In fact,
the most recent IRS estimates indicate that a range of approximately 77 to 80 percent of
taxpayers eligible to receive EITC benefits actually received benefits during the 2015 tax year,
which means approximately 21 percent of eligible individuals did not receive any benefits (IRS
2019c). Bhargava and Manoli (2015) send follow-up information to EITC-eligible nonclaimants in California, manipulating the presentation of various information regarding
eligibility and other program characteristics, and find that take-up increased significantly when
program information was more (instead of less) visually appealing and eligibility requirements
were more concisely listed.
Although traditional economics models have largely viewed them as inconsequential,
factors like hassle costs and complexity associated with determining eligibility have been found
to be more important than expected in affecting behavioral decisions in social program take-up.

5

This study focuses on tax incentives aimed at changing taxpayer behavior. The EITC can only be claimed by
individuals that earn income during a tax year. So, the EITC would only be considered a tax incentive to the extent
that it is aimed at encouraging working behavior in the subset of the population with the lowest levels of income.
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The potential consequences of failing to take advantage of a benefit offered through a social
program can be serious for these individuals and their families. The individuals eligible for these
means-tested programs are, by definition, around or below the poverty line in most cases.
Choosing not to take advantage of a program such as the EITC could literally lead to a family not
having enough food to eat during a given year. If small hassle costs like complex eligibility
requirements deter these at-risk eligible individuals from taking up available benefits from social
programs, the same may be true for individuals responding to tax incentives that encourage
desirable behaviors when these decisions almost exclusively involve a taxpayer’s discretionary
income. Therefore, I make the following prediction:
H1: Individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized behavior when
determining eligibility for the incentive is less (more) complex.
Tax Incentive Structure
Tax incentive structures – exclusions, deductions, and credits – are all aimed at
decreasing the amount of tax owed by a taxpayer, and all have been tapped by Congress to
incentivize taxpayer behavior changes. The decrease in tax, however, is achieved differently
through each incentive structure. In the simplest possible terms, income tax in the US is
calculated as follows: economic income is reduced by income exclusions to yield gross income;
gross income is reduced by deductions to yield taxable income; tax is a function of taxable
income and marginal tax rates; tax is reduced by tax credits and tax prepayments (tax
withholding and estimated tax payments) to yield actual tax due. Income exclusions reduce tax
by reducing the amount of economic income a taxpayer is required to include in gross income,
which reduces taxable income and ultimately reduces tax. Deductions reduce tax by directly
reducing taxable income, which ultimately reduces tax. Finally, tax credits reduce tax due
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“directly” on a “dollar-for-dollar” basis, with the reduction in tax occurring after tax has been
initially calculated on taxable income. See Figure 1 below for an illustration of this calculation.
Figure 1
Simplified Explanation of the Individual Income Tax Calculation
Income from all sources (economic income)
less: Items specifically excluded from income
equals: Gross income
less: Deductions
equals: Taxable income
Progressive tax rates applied
equals: Tax (before considering credits)
less: Tax credits and tax prepayments (i.e., withholding on salaries and wages)
equals: Tax or refund due with return
Another important difference in these tax incentive structures is each incentive’s
relationship to marginal tax rates. The economic value of an incentive delivered as an income
exclusion or a deduction is directly influenced by a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. The same
dollar amount of income exclusion or deduction reduces tax by different amounts for two
taxpayers subject to different marginal tax rates. Discussion / consideration of income
exclusions is omitted going forward for two reasons. First, income exclusions and deductions
reduce tax in similar manners. Secondly, income exclusions are certainly a large category of tax
incentives, but generally are reserved for tax incentives involving income earned (i.e., the
income exclusion for municipal bond interest earned) instead of money spent. For income
exclusion items that do involve spending, any administrative burden falls on employers (i.e.,
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income exclusion for amount of income spent on health insurance premiums) of the taxpayers
that benefit from the incentives.
The economic value of an incentive delivered as a tax credit is not influenced by
marginal tax rates. The same dollar amount of tax credit reduces tax by the same amount for two
taxpayers subject to different marginal tax rates. For illustration purposes, it is helpful to
consider two single taxpayers with income levels and, therefore, marginal tax rates on opposite
ends of a spectrum. If the first taxpayer has taxable income of $900,000, that taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate in the 2019 tax year would be 37 percent. If the second taxpayer has taxable
income of $9,000, that taxpayer’s marginal tax rate in the 2019 tax year would be 10 percent.
So, one additional dollar of deduction reduces the wealthy taxpayer’s tax by 37 cents while one
additional dollar of deduction reduces the low-income taxpayer’s tax by 10 cents. One dollar of
credit, on the other hand, would reduce each taxpayer’s tax by one dollar.
When analyzing tax incentive structure, relevant literature can be found in a wide array of
disciplines. Some accounting researchers have focused on whether behavior is most effectively
modified through tax incentives or through other methods of reducing the net cost of a choice.
Most recently, Stinson et al. (2018) provided evidence that tax credits are only as effective as
price discounts offered by retailers to encourage a purchasing behavior when the price difference
between the incentivized product and a standard alternative is high (price discounts are more
effective when price difference is low).
Most of the research in this area has been offered by economists and legal experts
focusing on which structure is theoretically more appropriate. Very little research, however, has
provided empirical evidence regarding each structure’s effectiveness in changing taxpayer
behavior in the incentivized direction. One recent study by Morrow et al. (2018) provides
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evidence that young individuals critical to the success of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) would
have been more likely to change their health insurance purchasing behavior in response to a tax
incentive delivered as an increase / decrease in deductions instead of the credit / surcharge
system created through the ACA. This finding has important implications in the tax incentive
literature and additional work is needed to provide broader evidence of the effect tax incentive
structure has on an incentive’s ability to change taxpayer behavior.
Tax credits, as detailed above, affect an individual’s tax bill differently than tax
deductions. The fact that deductions reduce tax due by the product of the deduction and the
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate is undisputed. One dollar of tax credit is, indeed, more valuable
than one dollar of tax deduction. Policymakers, however, do not deliver tax incentives in a
manner that gives taxpayers a choice between a tax credit and a tax deduction for the same
incentive. A given tax incentive is delivered as a tax credit or a tax deduction. An incentive
delivered as a tax credit will almost certainly include a limit that reduces the tax effect of the
incentive to an amount similar to the tax effect that would result from the same incentive
delivered as a deduction. Consider, for example, a hypothetical case of policymakers deciding to
change the structure of the tax incentive for qualified home mortgage interest from deduction to
credit. A taxpayer that traditionally deducts $20,000 per year in mortgage interest leading to tax
savings of $5,000 (assuming a 25% marginal tax rate) should expect to be allowed a $5,000
credit such that total tax savings are equal without regard to incentive structure.
A stream of literature addressing taxpayers’ understanding of and ability to use marginal
tax rates in decision-making began with Gensemer, Lean, and Neenan (1965), which provided
evidence of a general lack of awareness of marginal tax rates among many high-income
taxpayers. The study called attention to the possibility that economists’ assumptions of full
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taxpayer awareness of marginal tax rates could be invalid, stating that “Such exercises in
economic theory are significant only to the extent that taxpayers are in fact aware of their
marginal tax rates and changes in the rates” (Gensemer et al. 1965, 258). Several studies
followed providing additional evidence that taxpayers are either unaware of or unable to
accurately estimate their marginal tax rates (Fujii and Hawley 1988, Rupert and Fischer 1995),
and that greater marginal tax rate visibility (Rupert and Wright 1998) and lower levels of
complexity in the tax system affecting marginal tax rate determinations (Rupert, Single and
Wright 2003) improves taxpayer decision-making.
Another important and related empirical question to be considered, however, is whether
taxpayers are differentially affected by tax incentives structured as deductions or credits when
both structures yield identical reductions in tax (i.e., the economic value of the incentive is held
constant across incentive structures). We might consider whether a taxpayer in the top tax
bracket for 2019 (a 37 percent marginal tax rate) responding to a $7,500 tax credit that
incentivizes the purchase of a fully-electric vehicle would be more or less likely to respond to a
$20,270 tax deduction ($20,270 x 37 percent marginal tax rate = $7,500 tax savings)
incentivizing the same purchase. These incentives are economically equivalent, yielding the
same decrease in tax - $7,500. Traditional economic models that assume individuals are fully
rational would suggest that taxpayers facing these circumstances would be equally likely to
respond to the incentive without regard to the incentive structure. As mentioned above,
however, very few researchers have sought empirical evidence to support this fully rational
behavior and freedom from heuristics and biases.
There are some reasons to expect taxpayers to respond more favorably to deductions than
credits. Morrow et al. (2018) did not make directional predictions, but did suggest that

16

inexperienced taxpayers might be heavily influenced by the fact that deduction amounts will be,
by design, significantly higher in nominal value than credit amounts that reduce tax by the same
dollar amounts (i.e., a $1 credit is economically equivalent to a $4 deduction at a 25% marginal
tax rate). Morrow et al. (2018) also provides some evidence that certain taxpayers, specifically
young, inexperienced taxpayers, are more likely to respond to deductions than credits in a health
insurance context. Finally, some evidence exists in favor of deductions in the allocation of tax
incentives across structures – per Batchelder (2017), 78 percent of tax expenditures costs in the
2016 tax year stemmed from deductions, exclusions, or deferrals while only 13 percent of costs
stemmed from tax credits.6
There are, however, multiple reasons to expect taxpayers to look more favorably upon tax
credits. First, several previously-cited studies provide evidence that taxpayers are unaware of or
unable to accurately determine their marginal tax rates. The relationship between marginal tax
rates and deductions is detailed above. This intermediate step in calculating the economic
impact of a tax incentive could lead to uncertainty and an aversion to the deduction structure that
might not exist with the credit structure. A portion of my study answers a call for research by
Rupert and Fischer (1995) to “examine the extent to which taxpayer behavior is affected by
uncertainty about the MTR” (53).
Secondly, researchers in multiple disciplines often advocate in favor of the credit
structure over other incentive structures. Some researchers favor credits for the sake of
efficiency. Batchelder et al. (2006) and Batchelder (2017) indirectly discuss the definition of an
efficient tax incentive to be an incentive that jointly maximizes social benefits (the positive
behavioral change(s) resulting from the tax incentive) and minimizes cost in terms of reduced tax

6

The remaining 9 percent stemmed from “reduced rates on savings income” (Batchelder 2017).
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revenues. Batchelder et al. (2006) advocates strongly in favor of refundable tax credits7,
claiming that tax incentives should benefit all households uniformly “unless the balance of the
evidence suggests that more social benefits are generated by certain households engaging in the
behavior than by others or that certain households are more responsive” (47). Stegmaier (2008)
argues that refundable tax credits are preferable in higher education incentives because other
structures fail to encourage targeted taxpayers (those in low-income families) to pursue higher
education. These low-income families will be unlikely to send students to college without the
benefit of an incentive while middle- and higher-income families (those most likely to send
students to college without regard to tax incentives) are the only beneficiaries of education
incentives structured as deductions and nonrefundable credits.
While efficiency arguments focus on which taxpayers are and are not receiving benefits
as well as the cost associated with those benefits, others present a closely-related argument in
favor of the credit structure based on equity.8 Many have argued that wealthy taxpayers should
not yield more tax benefit per dollar of deduction than taxpayers with lower levels of income (a
function of marginal tax rates). This feature of our tax system, they claim, does not fit with our
emphasis on progressivity or vertical equity – the idea that taxpayers with greater abilities to pay
should pay more tax. Furman (2008) casts a spotlight on this inequity in the realm of health
insurance tax incentives and Fischer and Huang (2013) call the deduction allowed for qualified
home mortgage interest “ripe for reform,” advocating for a change in the incentive structure from
deduction to credit. Batchelder (2017), in a testimony delivered before the Senate Committee on

7

Most tax credits are non-refundable, but several refundable credits exist in the IRC. A non-refundable credit can
reduce tax due, but can never be used to reduce tax below zero. A refundable credit can be used to effectively
reduce tax due below zero, which could result in a refund that is larger than tax prepayments (i.e., withholding and
estimated tax payments).
8
There is considerable overlap in research that advocates for the credit structure for the sake of efficiency and
research that advocates for the credit structure for the sake of equity.

18

Finance in 2017, made the case that all tax incentives should be delivered as refundable tax
credits to end this relationship between the economic value of tax incentives and marginal tax
rates. Other calls to end this inequity come from presidential advisors as can be seen in reports
issued by commissions charged by President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama to
generate ideas for tax reform. The Bush commission’s report presented plans aimed at
preserving vertical equity by “shifting some tax preferences from deductions, which tend to
benefit high-income households, to tax credits, which benefit all taxpayers equally” (The
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 2005, xv). The Obama commission’s report
similarly advocated this switch, calling for the elimination of all itemized deductions with some
incentives added back to the IRC in the form of credits (The National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform 2010).
Another reason to expect taxpayers to be more responsive to credits is that writers in
business press generally have written about tax incentives in a manner that favors credits. Tax
credits are generally portrayed to be less complex and more valuable than tax incentives
structured as deductions. One example of this message being delivered through the business
press can be found in an article written by the Chief Tax Officer for Jackson Hewitt Tax Service
(someone that can reasonably be assumed to understand tax incentives). He wrote an article for
the Huffington Post with a title that represents a gross over-simplification of tax incentives –
“Tax Deductions are Good, But Tax Credits Are Better” (Steber 2016). After referencing an
earlier article that discussed commonly-missed itemized deductions, Steber wrote the following:
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“Deductions though, whether standard or itemized, only reduce your amount of taxable
income. Credits however are figured AFTER your tax liability and therefore, reduce
your tax bill dollar for dollar. Credits are not only good, they are better than deductions
and there are a lot of them.” (Steber 2016)
Another example can be found in a 2007 Kiplinger article with a similar title – “Tax Credit vs.
Deduction: If you have to choose one or the other, take the credit – it’s worth more” (Lankford
2007).
Finally, there is limited evidence of policymaker bias in favor of the credit structure.
There are very few cases of tax incentives being converted from one structure to another. Two
such transitions, however, both featured tax incentives originally structured as deductions being
transitioned to credits. First, the clean-fuel vehicle deduction was in effect through the 2005 tax
year but was converted to the hybrid vehicle tax credit beginning with the 2006 tax year (Sallee
2011). Secondly, an itemized deduction allowed for child and dependent care expenses was
converted to a credit under the Tax Reform Act of 1976. In a document prepared by the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, the General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the
conversion occurred to ensure the incentive was “available to those who use the standard
deduction as well as to itemizers and so that it will provide the same tax relief to taxpayers in
low brackets as to those in high brackets” (Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 1976, 7).
This language matches the theoretical justifications for favoring credits provided by economic
and legal researchers that was detailed above (efficiency and equity). The brief explanation is
void, however, of documentation of policymaker consideration of the structures’ effectiveness in
changing taxpayer behavior.
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Based on this evidence, I posit that the average taxpayer will view the tax credit structure
more favorably and will be more likely to change his/her behavior in response to the tax credit
structure. Therefore, I make the following prediction:
H2: Individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized behavior when the tax
incentive is structured as a tax credit (tax deduction).
Relationship between eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure
It is possible that eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure are
related and jointly affect a taxpayer’s response to a tax incentive – that eligibility determination
complexity affects incentives structured as credits differently than those structured as deductions.
Given the lack of empirical research investigating the effect of tax incentive structure on
taxpayer response to incentives, it is difficult to predict ex ante the existence and nature of an
interaction. Since tax incentives are so frequently structured and delivered as credits or
deductions, finding evidence of an interaction should inform future research on taxpayer
response to tax incentives. The early studies that address the effect of complexity on the
relationship between tax incentives and taxpayer behavior feature designs that do not manipulate
the structure of the incentive. Morrow and Rupert (2015) employ a design which holds constant
the incentive structure, while Bobek et al. (2016) use an abstract setting with no mention of
incentive structure. Developing a more thorough understanding of how complexity affects this
relationship in different incentive structures is an important next step. Morrow et al. (2018)
provided some initial evidence of the importance of incentive structure, but more research is
needed to expand our understanding of this variable. Therefore, I will investigate the following
research question:
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RQ: Does the effect of eligibility determination complexity on taxpayer response to tax
incentives depend on tax incentive structure?
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
I address my research questions by conducting an experiment, employing a 2×2 betweenparticipants design. The experiment consisted of a simple judgment and decision-making task
aimed at modeling the decision environment faced by a taxpayer incentivized to behave in a
certain manner consistent with what has been deemed desirable. The experimental design is an
adaptation of Morrow and Rupert (2015), which involves a vehicle purchase decision. I
administered the experimental instrument through Qualtrics. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions that varied by tax incentive structure (credit / deduction) and
eligibility determination complexity (low complexity / high complexity).
Experimental Procedures
Participants first provided consent and were asked to assume the role of someone helping
a friend make a vehicle purchase decision. Participants were then informed that a friend
purchasing a new vehicle has narrowed their decision to two choices and has asked for input.
This design feature is different from the Morrow and Rupert (2015) design, which asked
participants to assume the role of someone considering their own purchase of a new vehicle. I
made the design choice to use the “helping a friend” approach to avoid the problematic
experimental tactic of telling participants to assume their personal income is a certain number
(see discussion on income below). Following Morrow and Rupert (2015), participants were told
that the two vehicles are similar in all aspects important to the friend making the purchase
decision, and the critical difference is that one option is a traditional (gas) model while the other
option is a hybrid model. Style, handling, and acceleration for each model is said to be
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acceptable to the friend while reliability, safety, insurance costs, warranty and maintenance
programs, purchase method (cash instead of financing), and resell timing and value are all
consistent between the two options, and held constant across all conditions. Limited information
on purchase price, sales tax, fuel efficiency, and operating costs were presented to participants in
all conditions, with a reference to a detailed specifications list to come on a later screen.
Across all conditions, the two combinations of purchase price, sales tax, and five-year
cost to fuel the vehicle were constructed such that the two options were basically identical in
undiscounted total cost after considering tax savings. The estimated five-year cost to power each
vehicle was based on 12,000 miles of travel per year (60,000 miles total over the five year
period). For the traditional (gas) model, given fuel efficiency of 28 miles per gallon and using a
gasoline price of $2.27 per gallon, the five-year cost to power the vehicle is $4,864 ((60,000
miles / 28 miles per gallon) x $2.27 per gallon). This amount was rounded up to $5,000 for the
traditional (gas) model, and the estimated five-year cost to power the hybrid model ($3,500) was
reported as 70 percent (a reflection of the relationship between fuel efficiencies of the two
models, 28 mpg / 40 mpg = 70%) of the cost of powering the traditional model.
The undiscounted total cost of the traditional model is $30,440: the $24,000 purchase
price, plus $1,440 sales tax, plus $5,000 five-year fuel cost. The undiscounted total cost of the
hybrid model is $30,450: the $27,500 purchase price, plus $1,650 sales tax, plus $3,500 fiveyear fuel cost, minus $2,200 tax savings for purchasing the hybrid. The difference of $10 in
undiscounted total cost is in favor of the traditional model, but this amount is assumed to be
immaterial.
After reading the introductory information on the friend’s purchase decision, participants
were informed that the friend may qualify for a federal tax incentive that could reduce the
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friend’s federal income tax if the hybrid model is purchased. Participants were also informed
that the burden of determining eligibility to take advantage of the federal tax incentive falls on
the taxpayer (the friend, with the help of the participant), and were provided with a list of
eligibility requirements to consider. After receiving the list of eligibility requirements,
participants were provided with the detailed list of specifications for each vehicle mentioned on
an earlier screen. After reviewing the eligibility requirements and the specifications, participants
received information regarding the structure (credit or deduction) of the incentive as well as
detailed tax calculations specific to each vehicle purchase alternative. This process is illustrated
in detail in Figure 2, and the full instrument is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 2
Detailed Progression of Experimental Instrument
Introduction
Participants assume role of advisor to a friend making vehicle purchase decision
Participants view basic information on each of two comparable and acceptable models
identified by the friend – a traditional (gas) model and a hybrid model
Tax Incentive Eligibility
Participants learn of availability of a federal income tax incentive for hybrid model purchases
Participants view list of eligibility requirements friend must meet to be eligible for the tax
incentive (manipulated – high complexity or low complexity)
Participants view detailed list of specifications for each model
Tax Incentive Structure
Participants informed of structure of tax incentive (manipulated – tax credit or tax deduction)
Participants view information on friend’s estimated tax position given no vehicle purchase, the
purchase of the traditional (gas) model, and the purchase of the hybrid model
Dependent Variable
Participants provide a recommendation (DV) to the friend using an 11-point sliding scale:
0 = definitely recommend traditional (gas) model, 10 = definitely recommend hybrid model
Conclusion
Participants provide answers to various follow-up questions
Participants provide answers to various demographic questions
Participants conclude work in instrument and request payment
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Independent Variables
I manipulated my two independent variables, incentive structure (credit vs. deduction)
and eligibility determination complexity (low complexity vs. high complexity), between
participants to form four treatment groups. In the low (high) eligibility determination complexity
condition, participants were presented with a list of two (eight) requirements that a taxpayer must
meet to be eligible to take advantage of the tax incentive. While the actual determination of the
friend’s eligibility was not explicitly required, the fact that the purchase of the hybrid vehicle
presented in the experiment was indeed eligible for the incentive was held constant across
treatment conditions.
In the credit (deduction) incentive structure condition, participants were told that the tax
incentive comes in the form of a tax credit (tax deduction) and a calculation of the friend’s
estimated income tax situation before and after considering the incentive was provided.9 While
they are different, deductions for adjusted gross income (or “above-the-line deductions) and
deductions from adjusted gross income (the greater of the standard deduction or the sum of
itemized deductions) affect taxable income and tax due in the same manner (see Figure 1 above).
So, all participants viewed tax calculations incorporating a $12,000 standard deduction
(deductions from adjusted gross income are held constant across conditions), and participants in
treatment groups featuring the deduction structure saw the tax incentive delivered as a deduction
for adjusted gross income. And, although the structure of the incentive varied by treatment
condition, the tax effect or economic value of the incentive ($2,200 decrease in tax) was held
constant across conditions.

9

By calculating the tax effects of the incentive and providing it to participants instead of asking participants to
calculate the tax effects on their own, calculation complexity is effectively held constant.
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest for my study, Recommendation, closely parallels the
dependent variable of interest from Morrow and Rupert (2015), which measured participant
model preference for a personal car purchase decision using a seven-point Likert scale. In the
current study, I ask participants to indicate their recommendation to the friend that requested
advice on an eleven-point sliding scale (with numbers omitted from the scale), ranging from
“would definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model” to “would definitely recommend the
hybrid model.” I use an unnumbered scale to avoid potential bias related to choosing certain
numbers and because the numbers have no meaning beyond their coding for statistical analysis.
After providing a recommendation and without the ability to go back to change the
response, I asked participants in all conditions to indicate whether they would have liked to have
had additional information (yes or no) when making the decision. An open-ended question
followed to allow participants to indicate specific information they would have found to be
useful. After providing responses to manipulation and attention check questions (discussed
below), participants were asked to provide responses to several questions aimed at understanding
recommendations and several questions aimed at understanding preferences for tax incentive
structures. Participants were also asked to provide answers to various demographic questions.
Participants
Participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. I used the
third-party service of CloudResearch, powered by TurkPrime (formerly known as TurkPrime) to
handle posting, payments, and other administrative tasks related to the study (Litman, Robinson,
and Abberbock 2017). The use of this data source allowed me to recruit the most appropriate
sample for this study – a sample that represents US taxpayers and features appropriate variability
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in taxpayer experience, which would likely not have been attained by recruiting university
students.10 Multiple studies have recently provided evidence that samples obtained through
Amazon Mechanical Turk are appropriate for use in academic research. For example, Farrell,
Grenier, and Leiby (2017) used a three-experiment approach, finding evidence that “online
workers are willing to report their private information honestly and to exert effort, even when
these choices are very costly” (94). Also, Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson (2018)
conclude that “MTurk participants are reasonable proxies for nonprofessional subjects with
limited exceptions (e.g., non-U.S. MTurk participants may be cause for concern)” (119).
The Qualtrics instrument was accessed 1,174 times through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
An early screening question (“How many years have you filed a federal income tax return for
yourself / your family?”) led to immediate screen-outs of 327 participants answering “0 to 5
years”. Fifty unique Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker IDs were rejected payment for various
reasons.11 Many of these 50 rejected workers logged multiple attempts, leading to a total
reduction of 97 observations. In addition to screen-outs and rejected payments, total
observations was also reduced by three for participants failing to request payment. The full final
sample included 747 observations for unique Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker IDs receiving
payment (see Table 1 below).

I used several screening tools in Amazon Mechanical Turk: age ≥ 18, US citizen, US location at time of
participation (with blocking of suspicious geocode locations), 90 – 100 percent approval rate for Amazon
Mechanical Turk Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), less than 500 HITs approved, blocking of duplicate IP addresses
11
The most common reason for a payment rejection was the case of participants first accessing the instrument and
answering the screening question in a manner leading to a screen-out. The same Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker
ID was later recorded on a subsequent attempt with the screening question answer changed to avoid screen-out.
Other reasons for rejection of payment included invalid Worker IDs entered in Qualtrics and invalid secret codes
entered for payment.
10
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Table 1
Sample Construction
Times instrument accessed through Amazon Mechanical Turk

1,174

Less: Immediate screen-outs for low tax return experience¹

(327)

Less: Observations eliminated due to rejected payments²

(97)

Less: Observations eliminated due to no payment request³

(3)

Final Sample

747

Notes:
¹Participants responding “0 to 5 years” to the question of “How many years have you
filed a federal income tax return for yourself / your family?” were screened out
without pay before accessing the full instrument.
²Payment was rejected for various reasons for 50 unique Amazon Mechanical Turk
Worker IDs. Many of these 50 IDs logged multiple attempts to access the
instrument (a reason for payment rejection) such that eliminating these participants
eliminated 97 observations.
³Three participants logged complete attempts but never requested payment for their
participation.
Participants included in the full final sample were 36.14 years old on average, and
approximately 66 percent indicated household income less than $75,000. Approximately 58
percent of participants indicated tax return experience of fifteen years or less. Approximately
half of the participants indicated experience filing tax returns that included deductions for AGI,
itemized deductions, and tax credits (approximately 52, 47, and 56 percent, respectively). All
participants providing complete responses and properly requesting payment through Amazon
Mechanical Turk were paid a flat fee of $2.00 for their participation, which required, on average,
10.02 minutes of their time (an hourly wage of approximately $12 per hour). My sample
includes participants who are slightly younger than those in the Morrow and Rupert (2015)
sample (63.9 percent of their sample was over the age of 45). The distribution of participants
across genders in my study (58.77 percent female) is approximately equal to the distribution in
30

the Morrow and Rupert (2015) study (56.4 percent female). See Table 2 below for a full listing
of descriptive statistics for the full sample.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables

Age (Full Sample, n = 747)
Mean
Standard Deviation

36.14
10.11
Full Sample Percentages
n

%

306
439

40.96
58.77

76
228
190

10.17
30.52
25.44

$75,000 - $99,999
> $100,000
Tax Return Experience
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
More than 20 years
Filed Return with Deduction for AGI
Yes

109
144

14.59
19.28

250
182
107
208

33.47
24.37
14.32
27.84

389

52.08

No
Filed Return with Itemized Deductions
Yes
No
Filed Return with Tax Credits
Yes
No

358

47.92

351
396

46.99
53.01

421
326

56.36
43.64

Gender¹
Male
Female
Household Income
$0 - $24,999
$25,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
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Table 2 (continued)

Purchased Hybrid or Electric Vehicle in Past
Yes
No
Currently Shopping for New Vehicle
Yes
No

n

%

71
676

9.50
90.50

242
505

32.40
67.60

Notes:
¹Two participants selected “prefer not to answer when responding to a gender demographic
question.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
To verify the appropriateness of the manipulations of incentive structure and eligibility
determination complexity, participants were asked several questions after providing their
recommendations (the dependent variable). Participants first indicated on an eleven-point sliding
scale the level of complexity involved in determining eligibility for the tax incentive, ranging
from (0) not at all complex to (10) extremely complex. The mean value (standard deviation)
indicated by participants randomly assigned to the two groups featuring low eligibility
determination complexity was approximately 3.63 (2.68), while that of the participants in the two
high eligibility determination complexity groups was approximately 4.25 (2.64). This
difference, which is statistically significant (p = .001, two-tailed), indicates that participants in
the high complexity groups did indeed find the eligibility determination requirements to be more
complex than those encountered by participants in the low complexity groups.
Additionally, participants were asked to provide an assessment of the level of complexity
involved in determining the actual tax effect the tax credit / tax deduction had on the friend’s tax
liability, ranging from (0) not at all complex to (10) extremely complex. A significant difference
here would be surprising as participants in all groups were provided with the actual calculation
of the tax effect of the incentive. The mean value (standard deviation) indicated by participants
randomly assigned to the two groups featuring a credit structure was approximately 3.98 (2.58),
while that of the participants in the two deduction structure groups was approximately 4.12
(2.57). This difference is not statistically significant (p = .471, two-tailed), providing evidence
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that calculation complexity differences between the credit and deduction structures was
effectively controlled for and not likely to influence results.
The results above are consistent with differences (or lack thereof) in the amount of time
participants spent in the task. Participants assigned to groups featuring high eligibility
determination complexity spent significantly more time in the task than those in groups with low
complexity (means of 10.48 and 9.56 minutes, respectively; p = .034, two-tailed). However, the
amount of time spent in the task by participants responding to a credit structure (mean = 9.95
minutes) did not significantly differ (p = .745, two-tailed) from the amount of time spent in the
task by those responding to a deduction structure (mean = 10.09 minutes).
Attention Checks
Several additional questions were used to verify participants devoted ample attention to
the task. These six items included task-specific questions and, following guidance from
Buchheit et al. (2018), a question confirming participant understanding of the flat fee payment
structure. The results of three of these questions provided general evidence of satisfactory
“basic” attention – most participants correctly answered questions regarding the most expensive
option (approx. 93% answered correctly), the option with the highest five-year fuel cost (approx.
95% answered correctly), and the structure of the payment for participation (approx. 97%
answered correctly). Three other questions assessed participant understanding of more
“advanced” features of the task environment. Approximately 80.5 percent of participants
correctly answered a question regarding the friend’s eligibility status for the tax incentive,
approximately 64 percent correctly identified the structure of the tax incentive (credit or
deduction) encountered in the task, and approximately 74.2 percent correctly identified the actual
tax effect ($2,200 reduction in taxes) of the incentive encountered in the task. The accuracy of

35

answers provided for the actual tax effect question, however, varied markedly between groups
assigned to credit (approx. 88.9% answered correctly) vs. deduction (approx. 59.6% answered
correctly) conditions. This difference leads to noticeable differences in sample size in
subsamples constructed below. The mean number of attention check questions answered
correctly out of six was approximately 5.04.
I used the results of these attention check questions to construct multiple subsamples of
interest. I constructed subsamples including participants correctly answering all six attention
check questions (approx. 38.3% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “full attention”
subsample), participants correctly answering the three “advanced” attention check questions
(approx. 43.4% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “advanced attention” subsample),
participants correctly answering at least five of the six (that is, any five of the six) attention
check questions (approx. 75.2% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “high attention”
subsample), and participants correctly answering the three “basic” attention check questions
identified above (approx. 87.1% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “basic attention”
subsample).
Dependent Variable
The full sample mean (grand mean) of my dependent variable, Recommendation, was
8.21 (see Table 3 below). This measure represents a strong preference among participants for
the hybrid model, as responses were indicated on an eleven-point sliding scale (numbers omitted)
ranging from “would definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model” (0) to “would definitely
recommend the hybrid model” (10). The strong preference is likely not attributable to sampling
people who already own hybrid vehicles – recall from Table 1 above that only 9.5 percent of the
full sample indicated they have purchased a hybrid or electric vehicle in the past. This
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preference for the hybrid model is consistent with the results of the study by Morrow and Rupert
(2015), which also found a general preference in favor of a hybrid model over a traditional (gas)
model. This preference, however, is stronger in my study, which can likely be attributed, at least
in part, to my design choice to hold constant the after-tax cost of each model.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Recommendation – Full Sample

Credit
Incentive Structure
Deduction
Total

Eligibility Determination
Complexity
Low
High
8.326
7.867
(2.352)
(2.810)
8.348
8.286
(2.153)
(2.232)
8.337
8.081
(2.253)
(2.536)

Total
8.102
(2.592)
8.316
(2.190)
8.210
(2.399)

Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on
your friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation
using the following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would
definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely
recommend the hybrid model”)
Eligibility Determination Complexity (EligCondition): participants were randomly
assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with low (2 factors to consider) or high
(8 factors to consider) eligibility determination complexity
Incentive Structure (IncStructureCondition): participants were randomly assigned to a
group featuring a tax incentive structured as a credit or a deduction

Control Variables
I identified several potentially important control variables before conducting the
experiment. Morrow and Rupert (2015) and Morrow et al. (2018) include gender as a control
variable in their analyses, and the prior includes measures of participants’ concern for the
environment and participants’ views on tax system complexity, so careful examination of
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differences related to these three variables is warranted in my study. Additionally, because
Morrow et al. (2018) provides evidence that young, inexperienced taxpayers may have different
structure preferences than older, more experienced taxpayers, careful examination of differences
related to age and tax return experience is also warranted. Upon evaluation of correlations
between variables collected, however, I found no evidence of significant correlation between the
dependent variable and age or tax return experience.
Dependent variable scores did not significantly vary by gender when I considered the full
sample (means of 8.32 and 8.06 for females and males, respectively). In fact, scores did not
significantly vary by gender when I considered any of the subsamples constructed by attention
check performance. However, mean dependent variable scores did vary significantly by gender
when I considered subsamples that captured the balance of participants omitted in the
subsamples constructed by attention check performance. For example, in a subsample
constructed to exclusively include participants not correctly answering at least five attention
check questions (the balance of the participants not included in the “high attention” subsample),
female participants provided a significantly stronger Recommendation in favor of the hybrid
model than male participants (means of 7.94 and 7.04, respectively; p = .033, two-tailed). There
was not a significant difference in mean Recommendation scores by gender for the
corresponding “high attention” subsample (means of 8.44 and 8.40 for females and males,
respectively). This trend is robust across the “full attention” and “advanced attention”
subsamples. Among participants indicating some lack of attention to or understanding of the tax
decision context, perhaps those making their decisions based largely on emotion, it appears that
female participants illustrate a stronger preference for the hybrid model than male participants. I
examine this finding more closely below.
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There was evidence of a significant positive correlation between the dependent variable
and participant concern for the environment (Pollution) – preference for the hybrid model
increases as concern for the environment increases. Two other variables were significantly
correlated with the dependent variable at the 0.05 level. First, participant view of tax system
complexity (System_Complex) was negatively correlated with Recommendation – preference for
the hybrid model decreases as the feeling that the tax system is too complex increases. Secondly,
awareness of the actual tax incentive that exists in the current IRC for the purchase of hybrid
vehicles (Aware) was positively correlated with Recommendation – preference for the hybrid
model increases as awareness of the actual tax incentive in the current IRC increases. The
System_Complex and Aware variables, however, were significantly correlated with each other, so
only the Pollution and System_Complex variables were included as covariates in the analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) models that follow. Table 4 below reports correlation coefficients for
selected variables.
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Table 4

Rec
Rec

Male

Age

Pollute

Comp

Aware

D_AGI

D_Item

Credit

TRExp

Income

HybEle

Shop

-.054

-.001

.345***

-.114***

.090**

.005

.001

.065

-.040

-.037

.006

-.034

-.128***

-.009

.037

.097***

.031

.007

-.090**

-.077**

.065

.092**

.057

-.054

.161***

-.066

.127***

.225***

.068

.687***

.028

.016

-.150***

-.042

.049

-.049

-.046

-.026

-.058

-.034

.016

.039

-.089**

-.018

.060

-.058

.145***

.050

-.004

-.033

.041

.041

-.016

-.090**

-.029

.151***

.085**

.270***

.215***

.130***

.081**

.064

-.040

.125***

.179***

.137***

.079**

.025

.074**

-.038

<.001

-.020

.088**

.010

-.157***

.019

-.036

Male

-.029

Age

-.029

-.099***

Pollute

.343***

.001

-.058

Comp

-.092**

.055

.162***

.018

Aware

.082**

.099***

-.069

.054

-.079**

D_AGI

.012

.031

.145***

-.054

-.014

.041

D_Item

-.020

.007

.226***

-.050

.067

.042

.270***

Credit

.066

-.090**

.107***

-.036

-.051

-.016

.215***

.125***

TRExp

-.053

-.077**

.744***

-.057

.156***

-.085**

.130***

.179***

.074**

Income

-.046

.065

.078**

-.028

.058

-.027

.081**

.137***

-.038

.088**

HybEle

.007

.092**

.025

.022

-.005

.155***

.064

.079**

<.001

.010

.019

Shop

-.015

.057

-.133***

.054

-.030

.080**

-.040

.025

-.020

-.157***

-.036

-.088**
-.088**

Notes: Table 2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the
diagonal for selected variables. ** and *** indicate significance (two-tailed) at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation (“Rec”): participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your friend’s vehicle purchase
alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“would definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid model”)
Male: a dichotomous variable indicating gender as male (1) or female (0)
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Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables

Age: participant age in years
Pollution (“Pollute”): participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is harmful to the environment and reducing
this pollution is important to me” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex (“Comp”): participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system in the United States is too complex”
using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
Aware: participants responded to “I am aware of the actual federal tax incentive that exists for hybrid vehicle purchases and this
knowledge influenced by recommendation” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly
disagree”)
D_AGI: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) filed a tax return in the past that included a
deduction for AGI
D_Item: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) filed a tax return in the past that included
itemized deductions
Credit: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) filed a tax return in the apst that included a tax
credit
TRExp: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has tax return experience of more than 15 years (1) or tax return
experience of 15 years or less (0)
Income: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has household income of $75,000 or more (1) or household income
of less than $75,000 (0)
HybEle: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) purchased a hybrid or electric vehicle in the
past
Shop: a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant is (1) or is not (0) currently shopping for a new personal vehicle
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Table 4 (continued)

Tests of Hypotheses and Consideration of Research Question
First, I focus on results related to participants demonstrating a high level of attention
through performance on the six attention check questions detailed above, specifically presenting
results from the “high attention” subsample. Recall that the “high attention” subsample was
constructed to only include participants correctly answering at least five of the six (any five of
the six) attention check questions. I found qualitatively similar results for the “full attention”
(constructed to only include participants correctly answering all attention check questions) and
“basic attention” (constructed to only include participants correctly answering the three most
basic attention check questions) subsamples, so I do not separately present these results below.
Dependent variable unadjusted means with standard deviations and adjusted means with standard
errors for the “high attention” subsample are reported by treatment group in Panel A of Table 5
below. I estimated an ANCOVA model to assess the effects of eligibility determination
complexity and incentive structure on the dependent variable. The covariates identified above
(Pollution and System_Complex) were also included in the model.
I predict in H1 that individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized
behavior when the process of determining eligibility for the incentive is less (more) complex.
The results of the ANCOVA reported in Panel B of Table 5 provide support for H1. The
EligCondition variable is a significant predictor of Recommendation (F = 4.173, p = .042, twotailed) in the estimated ANCOVA model. The mean values in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that
participants in groups featuring low eligibility determination complexity issued a stronger
Recommendation in favor of the tax-incentivized hybrid model of the vehicle. There is also
evidence of a significant main effect of eligibility determination complexity in the “full
attention” and “basic attention” subsamples (not reported). Complexity in determining eligibility
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for a tax incentive encouraging the purchase of hybrid vehicles, it appears, has a behavioral
effect consistent with that found in the EITC study by Bhargava and Manoli (2015). The hassle
cost of eligibility determination complexity affects taxpayers responding to incentives
encouraging the use of discretionary income in a similar manner to its effect on taxpayers
deciding whether to participate in means-tested aid programs.
I predict in H2 that individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized
behavior when the tax incentive is structured as a tax credit (tax deduction). I do not find
support for this hypothesized main effect - the IncStructureCondition variable is not a significant
predictor of Recommendation (F = .338, p = .561, two-tailed) in the estimated ANCOVA model.
This finding is robust as I find no evidence to support a main effect of tax incentive structure in
any of the subsamples considered. This lack of support for H2 suggests that taxpayer behavior is
not differentially affected by different tax incentive structures alone. This finding suggests that
taxpayers seem to be rational in their consideration of tax incentives – given an equal tax effect
there is no evidence of a general preference for one structure over the other.
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Table 5
Analysis of Recommendation for “High Attention” Subsample¹
Panel A: Recommendation Descriptive Statistics
Unadjusted
Std.
Group²
Mean
Dev.
Low / Credit
8.649
1.898

Adjusted
Std.
Mean
Error
8.648
.168

148

Low / Deduction
High / Credit
High / Deduction

8.559
8.104
8.395

124
147
143

8.661
8.034
8.378

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Recommendation
Type III
Sum of
Source
Squares
Pollution³
310.689
System_Complex³
13.262
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

17.425
1.410
5.043
2321.621

1.647
2.815
2.109

df
1
1

Mean
Square
310.689
13.262

1
1
1
556

17.425
1.410
5.043
4.176

.184
.169
.172

n

F
74.406
3.176

Sig.⁴
<.001 ***
.075 *

4.173
.338
1.208

.042 **
.561
.272

Notes:
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of
covariance for a subsample constructed to exclusively include participants correctly
answering at least five of six attention check questions.
²Group: participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low /
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax
incentive structure
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values: Pollution = 7.70 and
System_Complex = 6.98.
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
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Table 5 (continued)
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid
model”)
EligCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity
IncStructureCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
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Although I did not find evidence to support a main effect of tax incentive structure, it is
possible that tax incentive structure can affect taxpayer behavior through interactions with other
variables. I also explored, as a research question, whether the effect of eligibility determination
complexity (EligCondition) on the dependent variable (Recommendation) depends on the tax
incentive’s structure (IncStructureCondition). Although not robust across the subsamples of
interest, there is some evidence of a significant interaction. The interaction term included in the
ANCOVA model for the subsample constructed to exclusively include participants correctly
answering all of the “advanced” attention check questions (questions on eligibility status,
incentive structure, and the incentive’s actual tax effect) is significant at the 0.10 level (F =
2.934, p = .088, two-tailed). Mean Recommendation scores and the results of the ANCOVA for
the “advanced attention” subsample are presented below in Table 6, Panel A and Panel B,
respectively.
These results suggest that the effect of a tax incentive’s eligibility determination
complexity depends on the tax incentive’s structure. A post hoc analysis of simple effects, as
shown below in Table 6, Panel C, indicates that the effect of eligibility determination complexity
is significant in the credit structure (F = 6.132, p = .014, two-tailed, Bonferroni adjustment for
multiple comparisons), but not significant in the deduction structure (F = 0.023, p = .879, twotailed, Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons). Within the credit structure, a shift from
low to high eligibility determination complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score
adjusted means from 8.82 to 8.08 – a significant shift away from the incentivized hybrid model.
Within the deduction structure, a shift from low to high eligibility determination complexity
leads to a shift in Recommendation score adjusted means from 8.68 to 8.73 – a shift in the
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direction of the incentivized hybrid model that is not significant. These adjusted means are
plotted below in Figure 3.
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Table 6
Analysis of Recommendation for “Advanced Attention” Subsample¹
Panel A: Recommendation Descriptive Statistics
Unadjusted
Std.
Group²
Mean
Dev.
Low / Credit
8.816
1.865

Adjusted
Std.
Mean
Error
8.820
.221

87

Low / Deduction
High / Credit
High / Deduction

8.676
8.075
8.730

65
102
70

8.769
8.020
8.729

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Recommendation
Type III
Sum of
Source
Squares
Pollution³
106.977
System_Complex³
18.796
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

9.305
5.061
12.477
1352.288

1.455
2.853
1.809

df
1
1

Mean
Square
106.977
18.796

1
1
1
318

9.305
5.061
12.477
4.252

N

.256
.205
.248

F
25.156
4.420

Sig.⁴
<.001 ***
.036 **

2.188
1.190
2.934

.140
.276
.088 *

Panel C: Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects
Source
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Credit
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Deduction
Effect of Incentive Structure given
Low Eligibility Complexity
Effect of Incentive Structure given
High Eligibility Complexity

df
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Mean
Square

F

Sig.⁴

318

26.077

6.132

.014⁵ **

318

.098

.023

.879⁵

318

.776

.183

.669⁵

318

17.560

4.129

.043⁵ **

Table 6 (continued)
Notes:
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of
covariance for a subsample constructed to exclusively include participants correctly
answering all three “advanced” attention check questions.
²Group: participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low /
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax
incentive structure
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values: Pollution = 7.74 and
System_Complex = 7.04.
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
⁵ All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid
model”)
EligCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity
IncStructureCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
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Figure 3
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation
for the “Advanced Attention” Subsample
Panel A: Predicted Effects
10
9.5

9
8.5
8
7.5
7
Low Complexity

High Complexity
Credit

Deduction

Panel B: Actual Adjusted Means in the “Advanced Attention” Subsample¹
10

9.5
9
8.5
8
7.5
7
Low Complexity

High Complexity
Credit

Deduction

Notes:
¹The figure plots adjusted means for a subsample constructed to exclusively include
participants correctly answering all three “advanced” attention check questions.
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To this point, I have only considered subsamples constructed by attention check
performance. It is possible, however, that the attention check questions used to create the
subsamples analyzed above represent general tax return experience. The participants I recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk represent a broad range of actual U.S. taxpayers. The
participants correctly answering the various combinations of the attention check questions might
represent a subset of the population of U.S. taxpayers most knowledgeable about and
comfortable with our tax system. Similarly, it is possible that a different subset of actual U.S.
taxpayers is not well-informed in the area of tax law and is appropriately represented by
participants in my study that were unable to correctly answer attention check questions at a high
rate. It is important, therefore, to consider broader subsamples and subsamples constructed using
alternative construction approaches.
First, I consider the full sample of participants successfully completing the instrument
and receiving payment (n = 747). Recall that the full sample mean of attention check questions
answered correctly out of six was 5.04. When I estimate the same ANCOVA model for the full
sample (two independent variables of interest, their interaction, and two covariates), I find results
that are not entirely consistent with those detailed above for subsamples constructed by attention
check performance. While there is still no evidence of a significant main effect of incentive
structure (F = .994, p = .319, two-tailed), there is no evidence when analyzing the full sample of
a significant main effect of eligibility determination complexity (F = .691, p = .406, two-tailed).
Table 7 below presents unadjusted and adjusted means in Panel A and the results of the
ANCOVA in Panel B.
Although the interaction term from the estimated ANCOVA model for the full sample is
not considered significant (F = 2.651, p = .104, two-tailed) at traditional levels, it does warrant
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an analysis of simple effects. When considering these simple effects, I find evidence of a
relationship consistent with that discussed above for the “advanced attention” subsample – the
effect of eligibility determination complexity is significant at the 0.10 level in a credit structure
(F = 3.007, p = .083, two-tailed, Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons), but not
significant in a deduction structure (F = .317, p = .574, Bonferroni adjustment for multiple
comparisons). The shift from low to high eligibility determination complexity leads to a shift in
adjusted means from 8.327 to 7.923 in the credit structure – a significant shift away from the
incentivized hybrid model. The shift from low to high eligibility determination complexity leads
to a shift in adjusted means from 8.224 to 8.354 in the deduction structure – a shift in the
direction of the incentivized hybrid model that is not significant. These simple effects are
presented below in Table 7, Panel C, and the adjusted means are plotted below in Figure 4, Panel
A.
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Table 7
Analysis of Recommendation for Full Sample¹
Panel A: Recommendation Descriptive Statistics
Unadjusted
Std.
Group²
Mean
Dev.
Low / Credit
8.326
2.352

Adjusted
Std.
Mean
Error
8.327
.163

190

Low / Deduction
High / Credit
High / Deduction

8.224
7.923
8.354

187
181
189

8.348
7.867
8.286

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Recommendation
Type III
Sum of
Source
Squares
Pollution³
491.465
System_Complex³
42.409
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

3.469
4.986
13.301
3718.241

2.153
2.810
2.232

df
1
1

Mean
Square
491.465
42.409

1
1
1
741

3.469
4.986
13.301
5.018

n

.164
.167
.163

F
97.943
8.452
.691
.994
2.651

Sig.⁴
<.001 ***
.004 ***
.406
.319
.104

Panel C: Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects
Source
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Credit
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Deduction
Effect of Incentive Structure given
Low Eligibility Complexity
Effect of Incentive Structure given
High Eligibility Complexity

df
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Mean
Square

F

Sig.⁴

741

15.090

3.007

.083⁵ *

741

1.590

.317

.574⁵

741

.994

.198

.656⁵

741

17.176

3.423

.065⁵ *

Table 7 (continued)
Notes:
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of
covariance for the full sample of 747 observations.
²Group: participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low /
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax
incentive structure
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values: Pollution = 7.64 and
System_Complex = 7.04.
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
⁵ All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid
model”)
EligCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity
IncStructureCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
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I used an approach similar to Morrow and Rupert (2015) to create an additional
subsample. I split the full sample into deciles by amount of time spent in the task and eliminated
observations for participants with times in the first and tenth deciles (hereafter referred to as the
“middle eight deciles” subsample). While eliminating participants not devoting enough time to a
task is a common approach (used in Morrow and Rupert 2015), the approach used here
recognizes that too much time spent in the task also likely represents an attention problem (i.e.,
starting and stopping, frequent distractions, etc.). This subsample includes observations for 599
(out of 747) participants, and unadjusted and adjusted means for this subsample are reported in
Panel A of Table 8 below.
I again estimated an ANCOVA model with the independent variables of interest, their
interaction, and the Pollution and System_Complex covariates. The results of this ANCOVA
(reported in Panel B of Table 8 below) are qualitatively similar to the results of the ANCOVA
for the full sample reported in Table 7 above. Within the “middle eight deciles” subsample,
there is no evidence of a main effect of eligibility determination complexity or incentive
structure. The interaction of the two independent variables of interest, while again not
considered significant at traditional levels (p = .118), is consistent with the results from the
ANCOVA model estimated for the full sample. The adjusted means for the “middle eight
deciles” subsample are plotted below in Figure 4, Panel B. Although the means (not reported)
are slightly different, p-values (not reported) for the covariates, the independent variables, and
the interaction term are qualitatively similar to and lead to the same conclusions when I consider
a subsample constructed to only exclude participants spending less than five minutes in the task
(the approach used in Morrow and Rupert 2015).
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Table 8
Analysis of Recommendation for “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹
Panel A: Recommendation Descriptive Statistics
Unadjusted
Std.
Group²
Mean
Dev.
Low / Credit
8.519
2.124

Adjusted
Std.
Mean
Error
8.509
.169

156

Low / Deduction
High / Credit
High / Deduction

8.292
8.181
8.504

148
134
161

8.345
8.164
8.460

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Recommendation
Type III
Sum of
Source
Squares
Pollution³
312.229
System_Complex³
27.318
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

.506
.415
10.821
2616.606

2.131
2.608
2.080

df
1
1

Mean
Square
312.229
27..318

1
1
1
593

.506
.415
10.821
4.412

N

.173
.182
.166

F
70.760
6.191
.115
.094
2.452

Sig.⁴
<.001 ***
.013 **
.735
.759
.118

Panel C: Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects
Source
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Credit
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Deduction
Effect of Incentive Structure given
Low Eligibility Complexity
Effect of Incentive Structure given
High Eligibility Complexity

df
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Mean
Square

F

Sig.⁴

593

7.724

1.750

.186⁵

593

3.440

.780

.378⁵

593

3.553

.805

.370⁵

593

7.615

1.726

.189⁵

Table 8 (continued)
Notes:
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of
covariance for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample into deciles by time
spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles.
²Group: participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low /
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax
incentive structure
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values: Pollution = 7.71 and
System_Complex = 7.03.
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
⁵All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid
model”)
EligCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity
IncStructureCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
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Figure 4
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation
for the Full Sample and the “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹
Panel A: Actual Adjusted Means in the Full Sample
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Panel B: Actual Adjusted Means in the “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹
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8
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Notes:
¹The figure plots adjusted means for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample
into deciles by time spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles.
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The “middle eight deciles” subsample eliminates participants based on time spent in the
task, but it does not explicitly account for attention check performance. I again considered the
“middle eight deciles” subsample, but included an additional covariate to control for the effect of
participant attention. The total number of attention check questions answered correctly
(AttnTotal) was significantly correlated with Recommendation and was not significantly
correlated with Pollution or System_Complex. I estimated an ANCOVA model including the
two independent variables of interest, the two original covariates, and the AttnTotal covariate. I
find results that are consistent with the ANCOVA models estimated for the full sample and the
“middle eight deciles” subsample without the AttnTotal covariate – no significant main effects
and a significant interaction (F = 3.097, p = .079, two-tailed). Unadjusted and adjusted
descriptives and the results of the ANCOVA are reported in Table 9 below.
When considering simple effects (reported in Table 9, Panel C), I find more evidence to
suggest that the effect of eligibility determination complexity is significant in the credit structure
(F = 2.822, p = .094, two-tailed, Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons), but not in the
deduction structure (F = .621, p = .431, two-tailed, Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons). Stated differently, I find that the effect of incentive structure is significant when a
tax incentive has high eligibility determination complexity (F = 3.786, p = .052, two-tailed,
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons), but not when eligibility determination
complexity is low (F = .258, p = .612, two-tailed, Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons). Within the credit structure, a shift from low to high eligibility determination
complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score adjusted means from 8.49 to 8.07 – a
significant shift away from the incentivized hybrid model. Within the deduction structure, a shift
from low to high eligibility determination complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score
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adjusted means from 8.36 to 8.55 – a shift in the direction of the incentivized hybrid model that
is not significant. These adjusted means are plotted below in Figure 5.
I find a recurring pattern when visually inspecting the means and standard deviations of
Recommendation for all subsamples considered to this point. The means (unadjusted and
adjusted) and standard deviations for three groups – the low eligibility complexity / credit group,
the low eligibility complexity / deduction group, and the high eligibility complexity / deduction
group – consistently form relatively tight clusters. The high eligibility complexity / credit group,
however, is consistently different. This group features the lowest mean (unadjusted and
adjusted) and the highest standard deviation across all subsamples considered to this point. This
finding suggests that the results of a significant main effect of eligibility determination
complexity and a significant interaction may be driven by this group.
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Table 9

Analysis of Recommendation for “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample with Attention Check¹
Panel A: Recommendation Descriptive Statistics
Unadjusted
Std.
Group²
Mean
Dev.
Low / Credit
8.519
2.124

Adjusted
Std.
Mean
Error
8.486
.167

156

Low / Deduction
High / Credit
High / Deduction

8.364
8.073
8.550

148
134
161

8.345
8.164
8.460

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Recommendation
Type III
Sum of
Source
Squares
Pollution³
268.344
System_Complex³
25.001
AttnTotal³
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

72.920
1.888
4.549
13.307
2543.686

2.131
2.608
2.080

df
1
1

Mean
Square
268.344
25.001

1
1
1
1
592

72.920
1.888
4.549
13.307
4.297

n

.171
.181
.164

F
62.453
5.819

Sig.⁴
<.001 ***
.016 **

16.971
.439
1.059
3.097

<.001 ***
.508
.304
.079 *

Panel C: Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects
Source
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Credit
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Deduction
Effect of Incentive Structure given
Low Eligibility Complexity
Effect of Incentive Structure given
High Eligibility Complexity

df

61

Mean
Square

F

Sig.⁴

592

12.124

2.822

.094⁵ *

592

2.670

.621

.431⁵

592

1.108

.258

.612⁵

592

16.266

3.786

.052⁵ *

Table 9 (continued)
Notes:
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of
covariance for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample into deciles by time
spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles.
²Group: participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low /
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax
incentive structure
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values: Pollution = 7.71,
System_Complex = 7.03, and AttnTotal = 5.11.
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
⁵All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid
model”)
EligCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity
IncStructureCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
AttnTotal: (a covariate) the total number of attention check questions (out of 6 total) answered
correctly by the participant
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Figure 5
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation
for the “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹ with Attention Check
10
9.5
9
8.5
8

7.5
7
Low Complexity

High Complexity
Credit

Deduction

Notes:
¹The figure plots adjusted means for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample
into deciles by time spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles.

General Linear Model Assumption Violations
ANCOVA relies on several assumptions common to general linear model analysis tools.
Two of these assumptions – normal distribution of the errors (or Gaussian errors) and
homogeneity of variance assumptions – are not satisfied in the data collected for this experiment.
Figure 6 below shows the Recommendation dependent variable is negatively skewed due to a
ceiling effect – a large number of participants (approximately 44% of participants in the full
sample) chose the highest possible value (ten on a scale from zero to ten, strongly in favor of the
hybrid model) when making their Recommendation. This type of departure from normality does
not respond to data transformations (i.e., square root and log transformations). A common
approach, given a sufficiently large sample size (the case in my study), is to ignore the
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assumption violations and rely on the robustness of the statistical test (ANCOVA in my study) to
handle the violations.
I did, however, use an alternative approach to address the assumption violations. I
dichotomized the dependent variable such that participants either did or did not make a
Recommendation of ten out of ten (i.e., the dependent variable became ten or “not-ten”). I then
estimated the following logistic regression model:
RecTen = β0 + β1EligCondition_Low + β2IncStructureCondition_Credit +
β3EligCondition_Low*IncStructureCondition_Credit + β4 Pollution +
β5System_Complex + ε.
The dependent variable, RecTen, equals 1(0) for participants choosing (not choosing) the raw
Recommendation score most strongly in favor of the hybrid model (a score of ten). The
independent variable, EligCondition_Low, equals 1(0) if eligibility determination complexity is
low (high), and the independent variable, IncStructureCondition_Credit, equals 1(0) if the
incentive is structured as a credit (deduction). The Pollution and System_Complex variables are
also included in the logistic regression model in the same form as indicated in the ANCOVA
models above.
The results, however, revealed no significant relationships between the dichotomized
dependent variable and the two independent variables of interest or their interaction. Further,
when I drop the interaction term from the model, which shifts the interpretation of the
independent variable coefficients from simple effects to main effects, I find no evidence of a
significant relationship between the independent variables and the dichotomized
Recommendation variable (not reported). Table 10 below reports the results of the logistic
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regression analysis for the full sample only, but the results of all subsamples are qualitatively
similar.
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Figure 6
Distribution of Recommendation
Panel A: Full Sample Distribution
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Panel B: Distribution by Experimental Condition
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Figure 6 (continued)
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Table 10
Analysis of Likelihood of Strong Recommendation (RecTen) for Hybrid Model

Variable
Pollution
System_Complex

β
.276
-.083

Odds
Ratio
1.318
.920

S.E.
.041
.035

Wald
Statistic
45.193
5.724

df
1
1

EligCondition_Low
IncStructureCondition_Credit
EligCondition_Low*
IncStructureCondition_Credit
Constant
Model:
n = 747
χ2 = 58.258***
Cox and Snell R2 = .075

-.244
-.083

.784
.920

.216
.218

1.270
.146

1
1

.133
-1.663

1.142
.190

.307
.429

.188
15.022

1
1

Sig.²
<.001 ***
.017 **
.260
.703
.664
<.001 ***

Notes:
¹The table presents the results of a logistic regression analysis for the full sample.
²*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
Variable Definitions:
RecTen: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your friend’s
vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the following
scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely recommend the
traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid model”) – coded as
1 if 10 and 0 if any score other than 10
EligCondition_Low: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive
with low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity – coded as 1 if low and 0 if high
IncStructureCondition_Credit: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction – coded as 1 if credit and 0 if deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
68

This finding, however, can be explained to some extent through a close (visual)
examination of the distributions for each of the experimental conditions shown above in Figure
6. As can be seen in Panel B, the frequencies of high scores (those strongly in favor of the
hybrid model) are approximately equal across the experimental conditions and the sample sizes
of the groups are also approximately equal. The independent variables are not significant in the
logistic regression model above, at least in part, because there is little variation in the distribution
of the dichotomized (ten vs. “not-ten”) dependent variable across groups. The independent
variables perform poorly in predicting scores of ten and “not-ten” because the variation in raw
Recommendation scores occurs on the bottom half of the eleven-point scale (the half in favor of
the traditional model).
I do find when looking at the distributions, however, a higher frequency of scores on the
lower half of the eleven-point scale (scores 0 through 4) in the group that responded to a tax
credit with high eligibility determination complexity. This finding is consistent with and
provides an explanation for the inflated standard deviation values for this group compared to the
other three groups as can be seen in Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9. It is also
consistent with the ANCOVA results above that indicate a significant effect of eligibility
determination complexity in the credit condition – participants in the high eligibility
determination complexity / credit group more frequently made recommendations in favor of the
traditional model (scores 0 through 4).
Supplemental Analysis: Open-Ended Questions
Participants provided responses to several follow-up questions after making their vehicle
purchase recommendations. First, I used an open-ended question to ask participants to indicate
the important factors that motivated their recommendations. Most comments indicated
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preference for the hybrid model, which is consistent with the full sample mean Recommendation
score strongly in favor of the hybrid model. The participants that recommended against the
hybrid often indicated they felt hybrid vehicles are too expensive to maintain. Many of the
participants recommending in favor of the hybrid model cited lower fuel costs and lower
environmental impact. Participants commonly indicated that the hybrid model was the “easy
choice” because the tax incentive made it the same overall price as the traditional model – a clear
indication of the effect of a tax incentive that effectively equalizes prices.
I used a second open-ended question to ask participants what additional information they
would have preferred to have when making their recommendation. Some of the more common
responses included the type / distance of normal driving for the friend, information regarding
battery maintenance costs for the hybrid model, availability of public recharging stations, and a
guarantee of eligibility for the incentive. This desire to see a guarantee of eligibility is an
indication of the effect of eligibility determination complexity as some participants were
apprehensive about recommending the hybrid model without perfect confidence regarding
eligibility.
Supplemental Analysis: Certainty
Participants also answered a question regarding their level of certainty about how the
incentive would affect their friend’s tax liability. The level of certainty was indicated on an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (not at all certain) to 10 (highly certain). In the full sample,
the mean value of certainty indicated by participants in the credit structure groups was
approximately 6.83, compared to a mean value of approximately 5.97 for participants in the
deduction structure groups (a significant difference, p = <0.001). This finding is robust – mean
values of certainty are significantly greater for participants responding to credits in all
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subsamples mentioned above. Further, the mean value of certainty does not significantly differ
between low and high eligibility determination complexity in the full sample or any of the
subsamples mentioned above. Because of the relationship with the marginal tax rate, credits
have been deemed to entail more certainty than deductions for how much actual tax savings will
accrue to a taxpayer when engaging in incentivized behavior and taking advantage of an
incentive. This uncertainty, however, should have been effectively eliminated by design as the
economic value of the incentive was held constant across incentive structure levels and the
calculation of the tax effect was presented in the instrument.
This difference is especially interesting when considered alongside participant responses
to other questions. As discussed above, responses to the manipulation check question regarding
complexity in determining the incentive’s actual tax effect were not significantly different
between structure conditions. Three other follow-up questions aimed at uncovering a general
taxpayer bias for one incentive structure over the other also failed to reveal strong preferences.
Participants were asked to indicate on 11-point sliding scales (0 in favor of tax credit and 10 in
favor of tax deduction) the structure they generally preferred (mean response approx. 4.94), the
structure they found to be easiest to handle (mean response approx. 5.06), and the structure they
found to be most valuable (mean response approx. 4.93). These seemingly-conflicting results
suggest that average taxpayers are more comfortable dealing with tax incentives structured as
credits, but are generally unaware of or unwilling to disclose their bias.
Supplemental Analysis: Gender
As indicated above, I found some evidence of differences by gender when considering
subsamples constructed to exclusively include participants not correctly answering various
combinations of attention check questions. Among all subsamples constructed by attention
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check performance, the “advanced attention” subsample provides the most even split of
observations – 324 participants correctly answered all three advanced attention questions and
423 did not. Recall that the “advanced attention” subsample was constructed to only include
participants correctly answering questions on the “advanced” features of the task environment
(questions on eligibility status, incentive structure, and the incentive’s actual tax effect). So, I
split a subsample constructed to exclusively include participants not correctly answering the
three “advanced” attention check questions by gender and estimated the same ANCOVA model
from above for each new gender-specific subsample. Adjusted means and the results of the
ANCOVAs are reported below in Table 11.
I find evidence of a significant interaction in the female-only subsample, but no evidence
of an interaction in the male-only subsample. In fact, males and females not performing well on
the attention check questions responded quite differently to the tax incentives in the task. I find
when analyzing the interaction in the female-only subsample that the effect of eligibility
determination complexity is significant given a credit structure (F = 3.700, p = .056, Bonferroni
adjustment for multiple comparisons), but not in a deduction structure (F = 2.640, p = .105,
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons). Stated differently, the effect of incentive
structure is significant given high eligibility determination complexity (F = 6.944, p = .009,
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons), but is not significant when eligibility
determination complexity is low. Within the credit structure, a shift from low to high eligibility
determination complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score adjusted means from 8.30 to
7.53 – a significant shift away from the incentivized hybrid model. The adjusted means for
males and females are plotted below in Figure 7.
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Table 11
Analysis of Recommendation for Subsamples by Gender¹
Panel A: Recommendation Descriptive Statistics by Gender

Group²
Low / Credit
Low / Deduction
High / Credit
High / Deduction

Adj.
Mean³
7.285
7.919
7.853
7.455

Male
Std.
Error
.433
.393
.515
.423

Female
Adj.
Std.
Mean³ Error
8.300
.264
7.986
.244
7.533
.299
8.540
.238

n
39
47
27
41

n
64
75
50
78

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Males

Source
Pollution³

Type III
Sum of
Squares
189.083

df
1

Mean
Square
189.083

System_Complex³
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

7.837
.100
.504
9.318
1050.522

1
1
1
1
148

7.837
.100
.504
9.318
7.098

Panel C: ANCOVA Results for Females
Type III
Sum of
Source
Squares
Pollution³
System_Complex³
EligCondition
IncStructureCondition
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition
Error

163.920
15.112
.728
7.680
28.059
1153.470
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df
1
1
1
1
1
261

Mean
Square
163.920
15.112
.728
7.680
28.059
4.419

F
26.638
1.104
.014
.071
1.313

Sig.⁴
<.001 ***
.295
.906
.790
.254

F

Sig.⁴

37.091
3.419
.165
1.738
6.349

<.001
.066
.685
.189
.012

***
*

**

Table 11 (continued)
Panel D: Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects for Females
Source
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Credit
Effect of Eligibility Determination
Complexity given Deduction
Effect of Incentive Structure given
Low Eligibility Complexity
Effect of Incentive Structure given
High Eligibility Complexity

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.⁴

261

16.351

3.700

.056⁵ *

261

11.668

2.640

.105⁵

261

3.371

.763

.383⁵

261

30.690

6.944

.009⁵ ***

Notes:
¹The table presents adjusted descriptives and analysis of covariance results for subsamples
constructed to exclusively include male participants not correctly answering all three
“advanced” attention check questions and female participants not correctly answering all
three “advanced” attention check questions.
²Group: participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low /
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax
incentive structure
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values: Pollution = 7.53,
System_Complex = 7.05 for males; Pollution = 7.58, System_Complex = 7.04 for females.
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All reported pvalues are two-tailed.
⁵ All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Variable Definitions:
Recommendation: participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid
model”)
EligCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination
complexity
IncStructureCondition: participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction
Pollution: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”)
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Table 11 (continued)
System_Complex: (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)
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Figure 7
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation
for Subsamples¹ by Gender
Panel A: Actual Adjusted Means for Males
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Panel B: Actual Adjusted Means for Females
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Note:
¹The figure plots adjusted means for subsamples constructed to exclusively include male
participants not correctly answering all three “advanced” attention check questions and
female participants not correctly answering all three “advanced” attention check questions.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this study, I conduct an experiment to examine whether eligibility determination
complexity and tax incentive structure affect taxpayers’ willingness to engage in tax-incentivized
behavior. In the task, which is adapted from Morrow and Rupert (2015), I ask participants to
make a recommendation to a friend deciding between two nearly-identical vehicle purchase
alternatives – a traditional (gas) model and a hybrid model. Participants are informed that a
federal income tax incentive is available for eligible taxpayers purchasing the hybrid model.
Participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to one of four
treatment conditions that manipulated eligibility determination complexity (low complexity /
high complexity) and tax incentive structure (credit / deduction).
My study answers a call for additional research on tax incentive complexity by Bobek et
al. (2016), as I predict and find evidence that suggests eligibility determination complexity can
significantly impact the behavior of taxpayers responding to tax incentives under some modeling
conditions. Specifically, I find evidence that taxpayers are more likely to respond to tax
incentives when determining eligibility is relatively easy. Analyzing subsamples constructed to
exclusively include participants correctly answering various combinations of attention check
questions, I find that participants responding to a tax incentive with low eligibility determination
complexity provided significantly stronger recommendations in favor of the tax-incentivized
hybrid model than those responding to a tax incentive featuring high eligibility determination
complexity.
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I also predict, but do not find evidence that tax incentive structure alone influences
taxpayer response to tax incentives. Participants responding to a tax incentive structured as a tax
credit provided recommendations that were not significantly different from those provided by
participants responding to an incentive structured as a tax deduction. Further, I do not find this
result to differ between younger and older taxpayers – incentive structure alone did not influence
recommendations for participants of any age or level of tax return experience. This finding is
mixed in its consistency with the results of Morrow et al. (2018), which provided evidence of a
deduction preference only among younger, less experienced taxpayers. While Morrow et al.
(2018) find evidence that only older, more experienced taxpayers act rationally when responding
to tax incentives of different structures but identical economic values (i.e., they have no
preference for one structure over the other), I find evidence of this rational behavior in
participants of all ages and experience levels.
Although I do not predict an interaction, I investigate the possibility of an interaction
between eligibility determination complexity and incentive structure as a research question.
When analyzing certain subsamples of interest, I find that the main effect of eligibility
determination complexity diminishes. I find evidence instead to suggest that taxpayers are only
influenced by eligibility determination complexity when responding to tax incentives structured
as credits. Specifically, taxpayers responding to credits seem to be less likely to behave as
incentivized when the credit features a high level of eligibility determination complexity. The
results of my study, therefore, are consistent with Morrow and Rupert (2015), which provides
evidence that taxpayers are more likely to respond to tax incentives when dealing with a less
complex incentive. I extend Morrow and Rupert (2015), however, by providing evidence
suggesting that this effect may only apply to tax incentives structured as credits.
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The effects of these variables seem to vary across different groups of taxpayers.
Taxpayers most familiar and comfortable with the mechanics of our tax system (those
represented in my study by participants correctly answering attention check questions at high
rates) seem to be less likely to respond to tax incentives of either structure (credit or deduction)
when eligibility determination complexity is high (a main effect of eligibility determination
complexity). It seems, however, that taxpayers in general – those represented in my study by
broader subsamples not constructed through attention check performance – are only less likely to
respond to tax incentives with high eligibility determination complexity when the incentives are
structured as credits.
This finding of an interaction in my study is an important extension of the tax incentive
complexity literature. Evidence suggesting the effect of a form of tax incentive complexity
(eligibility determination complexity in my study) depends on the structure of the tax incentive is
an important finding as we interpret the results of existing studies in this area (i.e., Morrow and
Rupert 2015 and Bobek et al. 2016) and continue to develop new studies aimed at understanding
the effect of tax incentive complexity on taxpayer behavior. When possible and appropriate,
researchers studying this effect should consider the possibility of a tax incentive structure
interaction during the design phase of future experiments.
I also find some evidence of a difference in taxpayer feelings toward the incentive
structures as participants responding to a tax credit indicated a significantly higher level of
certainty regarding the actual tax effect of the tax incentive encountered in the task than those
responding to a tax deduction. I provided participants with the actual calculations of tax,
effectively holding constant calculation complexity. So, this finding suggests that taxpayers are
in some way uncomfortable with the relationship between deductions and the marginal tax rate.
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While prior literature has detailed taxpayer discomfort in using and interacting with marginal tax
rates (i.e., Fujii and Hawley 1988, Rupert and Fischer 1995, Rupert and Wright 1998, and Rupert
et al. 2003), I find evidence to suggest that the discomfort is present even when taxpayers are not
required to incorporate the marginal tax rate into calculations.
Finally, the gender-related results of my study are mixed in their consistency with prior
literature. In all of the analysis presented above on the main samples of interest, I do not find
evidence to suggest gender is significantly related to Recommendation. This finding is consistent
with Morrow et al. (2018) – gender was included in all regression models reported in their study,
but was never significant. On the other hand, in my analysis of subsamples constructed to
exclusively include participants not answering various combinations of attention check
questions, I find that gender is significantly related to Recommendation. This finding is
consistent with Morrow and Rupert (2015) – gender is a significant covariate in the main
ANCOVA analysis provided in their study. These mixed results should lead to a close
examination of the effect of gender in future studies as it seems, from the results of my study,
that the effect of gender might only affect certain subsamples and, by extension, certain subsets
of the population of taxpayers.
This study makes several other important contributions. First, it extends the tax literature
that addresses the effect of complexity on the effectiveness of tax incentives by addressing a
previously unexplored aspect of complexity – eligibility determination complexity. This aspect
of complexity is important because eligibility determination is often determinable without
detailed calculations and estimations of tax effects. Eligibility determination, therefore, is a
decision factor a taxpayer can more easily consider before making a decision than many other
factors in the decision context of a tax incentive.
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My study also expands this stream of tax literature by further addressing the effect of a
variable we know very little about - incentive structure. My study is one of the first to
incorporate a design that does not hold constant incentive structure. As stated above, this
variable can only be studied reliably using an experimental methodology as tax incentives are
delivered to taxpayers as tax credits or tax deductions. I employ a design that allows me to
investigate taxpayer response to exactly the same tax incentive delivered as a credit and a
deduction.
My study also provides evidence that should be of interest to tax policymakers as I find
that even a modest change in eligibility determination complexity can have a significant impact
on a taxpayer’s response to a tax incentive. This information should be important to
policymakers writing new and modifying existing tax laws aimed at changing taxpayer behavior.
Developing a better understanding of the effect of tax incentive structure should be important to
policymakers for the same reason. As noted above, Batchelder et al. (2006), Stegmaier (2008),
and others use equity and efficiency arguments to advocate in favor of a move to exclusively use
the refundable tax credit structure. Given tax incentives with low levels of eligibility
determination complexity, this could be a reasonable and equitable approach. The results of my
study, however, suggest that taxpayers responding to tax credits featuring high levels of
eligibility determination complexity may be less likely to behave as incentivized. When high
eligibility complexity is required in a tax incentive aimed at changing taxpayer behavior, it
seems policymakers should actually favor the deduction structure.
Finally, this study also contributes to the literature that addresses the take-up of social
benefits as it extends our understanding of the effect of hassle costs across different programs
and demographics. The same hassle cost (that of determining eligibility) that keeps taxpayers
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with the lowest levels of income from applying for social benefits like Medicaid and taking
advantage of the EITC also seems to make taxpayers of diverse income levels less likely to
engage in tax-incentivized behaviors. I find that this may be especially true within tax incentives
structured as credits, which as noted above, are championed by many legal experts as the most
appropriate structure for tax incentives. These experts, it seems, are lobbying for a wholesale
shift in the direction of an incentive structure that could lead to poor taxpayer response to
incentives with high levels of eligibility determination complexity.
This study has multiple limitations that lead to future research opportunities in the
context of complexity in tax incentives. I made a design choice in my study to manipulate tax
incentive structure as deduction for adjusted gross income vs. credit. This is a limitation in that
although the two types of deductions affect tax in the same manner, I am unable to rule out the
possibility that taxpayers could respond differently to tax incentives structured as deductions
from adjusted gross income (itemized deductions). But, this limitation also provides
opportunities for future research as the type of deduction can and should be manipulated in
future studies.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (hereafter, TCJA 2017) certainly changed the
landscape for tax incentives. During the 2016 tax year (pre-TCJA 2017), approximately 30
percent of individual taxpayers elected to itemize deductions – a majority of taxpayers claimed
the standard deduction (IRS 2018, 20). These numbers, however, reflect taxpayer deduction
behavior when the standard deduction was approximately half the amount it was for the 2018 tax
year (post-TCJA 2017). The increases in standard deduction amounts will certainly lead to an
even smaller percentage of the population electing to itemize deductions, and the discussion of
deduction versus credit for tax incentives will be affected. Howard Gleckman, senior fellow at
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the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, predicted that less than ten percent will itemize postTCJA 2017 (Gleckman 2017). His estimate was reasonably accurate – early data released by the
IRS reveals that approximately 10.4 percent of taxpayers filing 2018 tax returns through July
2019 chose to itemize deductions (IRS 2019b).
This change in the incentive landscape could lead to some combination of two possible
outcomes. One possibility is that policymakers could begin to rely primarily on credit structures
for new incentives while shifting existing incentives from itemized deduction to credit structures.
Another alternative would be to shift existing and new incentives from deductions from adjusted
gross income (itemized deductions) to deductions for adjusted gross income (or “above-the-line
deductions”) (Gleckman 2017). Although the landscape has changed drastically, it is highly
unlikely that policymakers will adopt a model that exclusively uses credit structures to deliver
tax incentives. If this shift does occur, I provide evidence that it could negatively impact
taxpayer response when eligibility determination complexity is high. Until then, developing a
better understanding of how incentive structure affects taxpayer reaction to incentives will
continue to be an important issue.
Additionally, my study does not manipulate the refund/tax due position of the taxpayer.
In fact, my instrument ends the tax calculation presented to participants without presenting tax
prepayment or a tax due / tax refund position. I find that participants in my study were
significantly influenced in the direction of the incentivized hybrid model based on the tax
savings alone. Future research could extend my study by considering whether those tax savings
differentially affect taxpayer behavior when leading to a reduction of tax due vs. an increase in
tax refund.
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Another factor not addressed or manipulated in my study is the amount of time that
passes between the decision to behave in the tax-incentivized direction and the filing of a tax
return that allows a taxpayer to realize the related tax benefit. Again, future research could
consider the effect of this time lag on taxpayer response to tax incentives.
Finally, my study features a choice between comparable alternatives for which the aftertax, long-term cost of the tax-incentivized alternative is approximately equal to the cost of the
alternative not incentivized. Many participants in my study indicated this to be an important
factor in the recommendation in favor of the hybrid model. Future research should also consider
taxpayer behavior in choice environments where the tax-incentivized alternative has a greater
after-tax cost than the non-incentivized alternative.
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Appendix: Full Experimental Instrument
[Screening question, preceded only by consent page]
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[Tax Incentive Structure = Credit]
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[Tax Incentive Structure = Deduction]

95

[Dependent variable = Recommendation]
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[Manipulation checks for participants assigned to a credit condition]
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[Manipulation checks for participants assigned to a deduction condition]
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[Attention check questions]
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[Certainty]
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[Credits vs. deductions]
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[Controls]
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